The All Writs Statute and the Injunctive Power of a Single Appellate Judge by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 2 
1965 
The All Writs Statute and the Injunctive Power of a Single 
Appellate Judge 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Judges Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, The All Writs Statute and the Injunctive Power of a Single Appellate Judge, 64 MICH. 
L. REV. 324 (1965). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/10 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
324 Michigan Law Review 
The All Writs Statute and the Injunctive Power of 
a Single Appellate Judge 
[Vol. 64 
In the federal court system the power of the judiciary to issue 
writs-formal orders requiring responsive action1-is embodied in 
a single legislative provision, section 1651 of Title 28 of the United 
States Code, known as the All Writs Statute: 
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages 
and principles of law. 
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a 
justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction.2 
Because section 1651 is general in its terms and incorporates by ref-
l. Compare Poirier v. East Coast Realty Co., 84 N.H. 461, 152 Atl. 612 (1931), with 
Watson v. Keystone Iron Works Co., 70 Kan. 43, 74 Pac. 269 (1904). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964). The provisions of § 1651 have been supplemented by 
statutes specifically granting the power to issue certain writs. For example, an entire 
chapter of Title 28-§§ 2241-55-is devoted to the writ of habeas corpus. Section 16~1, 
however, confers upon the federal courts the general common-law writ power. 
There is some question as to the ultimate source and nature of the § 1651 writ 
power. It has been suggested, for example, that the power of the Supreme Court to 
issue some § 1651 writs is greater than that of the courts of appeals, which owe their 
existence to statute rather than to the Constitution. Compare McClellan v. Carland, 
217 U.S. 268 (1910), with In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 103 F.2d 901 
(3d Cir. 1939). See Wolfson, Extraordinary Writs in the supreme Court Since Ex Parle 
Peru, 51 CoLuM. L. REv. 977 (1951). Closely related is the question whether Congress 
could take away the power of federal appellate courts to keep a case in reviewable 
posture through § 165l(a). For an affirmative answer, see Note, Powers of the supreme 
Court Justice, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 981, 1002 (1964). On the other hand, one might 
analogize this specific writ power to the contempt power, which some have suggested 
is inherent in the concept of a court. See GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POW.EA 23 (1963), If 
this analogy is valid, then the very establishment of a court by a legislature would 
include a grant of the writ power. 
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erence the whole body of common law regarding writs, determining 
its proper function has sometimes been difficult. The proper scope 
of the statute's broader subsection, 165I(a), has been much more 
clearly delineated than has that of subsection (b), even though the 
latter, by comparison, appears to be of quite limited application. 
Indeed, while the role of subsection (a) as an aid to interlocutory 
review has been thoroughly debated,8 almost no analytical discus-
sions of subsection (b) are to be found.4 
Although section 1651 was enacted in its present form in 1948, 
the statutory language of subsection (a) can be traced back to the 
original Judiciary Act of I 789, 5 in· contrast to the terminology in 
3. See, e.g., 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.10 (2d ed. 1953); Wolfson, supra note 2. 
It is clear that the phrase "all writs" in § 165l(a) encompasses the common-law 
writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari. See United States Alkali Export Ass'n 
v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945). Also included are injunctions, see Scripps 
Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); subpoenas, see Bethlehem Ship Building 
Corp. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1941); writs of ne exeat, see Judson v. Judson, 
8 F.R.D. 336 (D.D.C. 1943); and writs of habeas corpus, see Price v. Hobston, 334 U.S. 
266 (1948). Although courts of appeals cannot issue original writs of habeas corpus as 
they have no original jurisdiction, they may issue habeas corpus as an auxiliary writ 
when necessary in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction. Adams v. United States 
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1943). 
The ways in which two subsection (a) writs, mandamus and prohibition, serve to 
"aid jurisdiction" by keeping a case in a reviewable posture merit brief discussion. 
These extraordinary writs traditionally have bad a supervisory function. See generally 
6 MOORE, op. cit. supra, § 54.10; WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 402 (1963). By means of these 
writs, which are directed to-a lower court judge after be bas issued or refused to issue 
an interlocutory order, the federal appellate courts can correct errors without waiting 
for final disposition of the case and an appeal. Such use of§ 165l(a) bas been restrained, 
see Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956); recent dicta that the writs cannot be used 
as mere substitutes for appeal accurately describe the traditional practice. See, e.g., 
Bankers Life 8: Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); Hall v. West, 335 F.2d 481 (5th 
Cir. 1964). However, hints of a more positive approach to the use of § 165l(a) for 
review of interlocutory orders are found as early as the landmark case of Ex parte Peru, 
318 U.S. 578 (1943), which held that .even if an eventual right of appeal exists, 
§ 165l(a) extraordinary writs can nevertheless issue. The Supreme Court declared that 
the issuance of such writs is not a question of power but rather one of discretion. A 
broad scope of power is assumed, and when the action below is sufficiently extra-
ordinary, the court may exercise its discretion and issue the writ. The Supreme Court 
has continued to follow this view. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 
(1957); United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945). But cf. 
Bankers Life 8: Cas. Co. v. Holland, supra. 
The importance ·of § 1651 as a means of interlocutory review in this area has been 
reduced by a 1958 amendment to the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964), which 
provides for discretionary review by a court of appeals of any interlocutory order if a 
district court judge certifies that such review is desirable. This statute eliminates the 
need for writs of mandamus and prohibition except 'when a district judge bas refused 
certification and the order is appropriately reviewable by either of these extraordinary 
writs. See United States v. Woods, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961); Holub Industries, 
Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1961); WRIGHT, op. cit. supra, at 403-04. 
4. For brief discussions of § 165l(b) which examine neither its language nor its 
history, see ROBERTSON 8: KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 438, at 893 n.10 (2d ed. Wolfson&: Kurland 1951); 62 HARV. L. REv. 311 (1948). 
5. Subsection (a) is based on .the Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, §§ 234, 262, 36 Stat. 
1156, 1162, which was derived from REv. STAT. §§ 688, 716 (1875). These sections 
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subsection (b), the origins of which are obscure.6 It is clear, however, 
that both the alternative writ and the rule nisi are granted on 
motions ex parte and are in the nature of show-cause orders.7 These 
writs were at one time used in place of the modern summons or 
process and also served as a means of framing the issues to be con-
tested before a court of either original or appellate jurisdiction.8 
Functionally the nvo writs are closely related,9 and the use of the 
word "or" in the statute suggests that Congress may have viewed 
them as interchangeable to some extent. Their operation is simple. 
Once a rule nisi is obtained, notice is served on the party against whom 
redress is sought to show cause why the requested relief should not 
b,e granted. At the hearing, argument proceeds as upon an ordinary 
motion except that it is the party showing cause, rather than the 
party who brought about the issuance of the writ, who is entitled 
to open and close. I£ the party who secured the rule nisi prevails, 
or if the other party defaults, the rule is made final, and the requested 
were in turn based on the Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 13, 14, 1 Stat. 81 (1789). Sec Ex 
parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
6. The Reviser's Note to § 1651 indicates that subsection (b) is derived from 28 
U.S.C. § 376 (1940), which provided that "writs of ne exeat may be granted by any 
justice of the Supreme Court, in cases where they might be granted by the Supreme 
Court; and by any district judge, in cases where they might be granted by the district 
court .••• " The relationship of subsection (b) to § 376 is unclear. The writ of ne excat 
is not an alternative writ in form. It is used "in equity against one who 'designing to 
avoid the justice and equity of the court, is about to go beyond the sea, so that the 
duty will be endangered if he goes.'" In re Lipke, 98 Fed. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1900), It is 
probable that ne exeat would issue as a common-law writ under § 165l(a). See Judson 
• v. Judson, 8 F.R.D. 336 (D.D.C. 1943). It is also probable that the Reviser's Note 
refers to the single-justice language of § 376, which provides the only similarity 
between the older provision and § 165l(b). 
7. The following state decisions contain thorough discussions of the nature and 
use of alternative writs: Burkett v. Youngs, 135 Me. 459, 199 Atl. 618 (1936); Libby v. 
York Shore Water Co., 125 Me. 144, 131 Atl. 862 (1926); Hamlin v. Higgins, 102 Mc. 
510, 67 Atl. 625 (1907); State v. Sevier, 68 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1934). Rules nisi arc discussed 
in Ex parte Shure, [1926] 1 K.B. 127; Rex v. Manchester&: Leeds R.R., 8 A.D. &: E. 413, 
112 Eng. Rep. 895, 897-98 (K.B. 1838). 
8. See Aspinwall v. County Comm'rs, 2 Fed. Cas. 67 (No. 593) (7th Cir.), aff'd, 65 
U.S. (24 How.) 376 (1859). The following state cases discuss the functional aspects of 
the alternative writ: Emery v. Superior Court, 89 Ariz. 246, 360 P. 2d 1025 (1961); State 
ex rel. Sharp v. Knight, 224 Mo. App. 761, 26 S.W.2d 1011 (1930). The English case of 
Rex v. Manchester &: Leeds R.R., supra note 7, demonstrates the function of the rule 
nisi. See generally 3 STEPHENS, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 679-80 (1st 
Am. ed. 1845). Scorr &: SIMPSON, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 866 (1950) indicates that 
before the reorganization of the English courts in 1875, a rule nisi could be used to 
bring trial court proceedings before the full bench of one of the superior courts at 
Westminster for review. 
The procedure respecting alternative writs is illustrative: (I) an ex parte petition 
or application is made to the court or a judge thereof; (2) the writ, which serves both 
as process and the first pleading, is issued; (3) a return or answer is made by the 
respondent, to which petitioner may demur, thus framing the issues to be considered 
by the court before granting or denying relief. See Hamlin v. Higgins, supra note 7; 
Wn.LEY, PROCEDURE IN THE COURTS 113 (1894). 
9. See cases cited note 8 supra. 
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remedy is granted.10 Although the alternative ·writ, which originated 
with the ancient writ praecipe,11 is used in the United States mainly 
in connection with the writ of peremptory (final) mandamus, the 
two are to be contrasted.12 The alternative mandamus was once the 
prevalent initial step taken by one wishing to obtain the peremptory 
mandamus.13 It is a direction to the party against whom it is issued 
either to undertake some act or else to appear and show cause why 
the act need not be done. If sufficient cause 'is not shown at the 
hearing, a peremptory mandamus requiring performance will 
issue.14 
Considering this historical background, it appears that section 
1651 contemplates a two-step procedure with regard to alternative 
·writs and rules nisi. The first step, issuance of the show-cause order, 
can be undertaken by a single judge or justice by virtue of subsec-
tion (b), but the second step, consideration of the merits of the 
movant's claim and issuance of a peremptory writ or absolute rule, 
is for a properly constituted court within the meaning of subsec-
tion (a). This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that it appears that 
any writ authorized by subsection (a) could be issued after proceed-
ings are commenced by means of either an alternative writ or a 
rule nisi.16 Therefore, unless such a two-step procedure were in-
tended an anomalous situation would exist. A party desiring a per-
emptory writ of mandamus to a trial judge, for example, could 
either obtain it directly from a three-judge panel of a court of 
appeals under subsection (a) or by indirection from one of the 
three judges if the petitioner chose to seek first an order under 
subsection (b) calling upon his adversary to show cause why the writ 
should not issue.16 
Because of the show-cause nature of section 1651 (b) writs, no 
substantive rights are finally determined merely by the issuance 
of such a ·writ. A person against whom one of these writs is directed 
10. 3 STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 680; see United States v. Kendall, 26 Fed. 
Cas. 702 (No. 15517) (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1837), for a discussion of 
the issuance of a "mandamus nisi." 
11. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIIE LAws OF ENGLAND 273 (Wendell ed. 
1854). The writ praecipe was one of the first original writs used by the Crown to 
initiate proceedings in its courts. See ge~erally KIMBALL, INTRODUCTION 'I'O TIIE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 68-70 (1961). . 
12. See, e.g., Katsh v. Rafferty, 12 F.2d 450 (E.D.N.Y. 1926); West Va. No. R.R. v. 
United States, 134 Fed. 198 (4th Cir. 1904); Aspinwall v. County Comm'rs, 2 Fed. Cas. 
67 (No. 593) (7th Cir.), afj'd, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376 (1859). 
13. See 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 271. It is clear, however, that the 
alternative writ is no longer a required preliminary step in obtaining a peremptory 
mandamus, so long as the party against whom a remedy is sought has notice. See 
Fairbanks v. Amoskey Nat. Bank, 30 Fed. 602 (1st Cir. 1887); Aspinwall v. County 
Comm'r, supra note 12. 
14. See note 8 supra. 
15. See cases cited notes 7 & 8 supra. 
16. Cf. text accompanying notes 21 & 22 infra. 
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is not required to alter his behavior until he has failed to show 
cause.17 This relative impotence of a show-cause order of the kind 
issued under section 165I(b) should be contrasted with the effect 
of a superficially related writ, the temporary restraining order. 
Although a temporary restraining order can be a first step toward 
securing a preliminary or permanent injunction and is obtained 
ex parte, it commands the person against whom it is issued immedi• 
ately to do, or to refrain from doing, some act. Conformity to its 
directive is required even before an adversary hearing on the merits 
of the petitioner's prayer for relief.18 Its issuance is actually an 
exercise of the court's injunctive power.19 This important distinc• 
tion between the first phase in the alternative writ or rule nisi 
process and the temporary restraining order has seemingly been 
ignored in several recent opinions in which individual judges of 
circuit courts of appeals have relied upon section 1651(b) as author-
ity for granting temporary restraining orders.20 Although it is 
clear that such an order will issue under section 1651 (a),21 that 
provision grants its powers. to the Supreme Court and other courts. 
This language, juxtaposed to that in section 165l(b), would seem 
to preclude the issuance under the All Writs Statute of a temporary 
restraining order, or any other writ not essentially the same as those 
authorized by subsection (b), by an individual judge of a multi-judge • 
court.22 
Apparently the first suggestion that section 165I(b) embraces 
the injunctive power came in 1958 in Aaron v. Cooper.23 Before 
17. See note 8 supra. Of course, one has the alternative of obeying the writ without 
contest, just as one can ignore a civil summons and submit to a default judgment, 
18. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE L\BOR INJUNCTION 53 (1930): WILLEY, op. cit. 
supra note 8, at 120. 
19. "Injunctive writs are of three general classes: first, the temporary restraining 
order or injunction ad interim, which in the ordinary course issues ex parte without 
notice or hearing; second, the temporary injunction, or injunction pendente lite 
issuing after notice and opportunity to be heard; third, the permanent injunction, 
based on a full hearing and enforcing the final decision on the merits. Hearings on 
motions to continue or dissolve a restraining order or temporary injunction are inter• 
vening stages in this process." FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. dt. supra note 18, at 53-54. 
20. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 
1000 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 1883 (1964); Woods v. Wright, 8 
RACE REL. L. REP. 445 (5th Cir. May 22, 1963); Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir.), 
aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The terminology in these cases differs because some judges 
characterize their orders as preliminary or temporary injunctions. However, it is 
clear that their writs fall within the category of "temporary restraining orders." Sec 
note 19 supra. 
21. See Scripps Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Eastern Greyhound Lines 
v. Fusco, 310 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1962); Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 
F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950). 
22. Cf. text accompanying notes 15 and 16 supra. It would seem that courts and 
judges are distinguishable entities and that the act of a judge is not necessarily the act 
of the court on which he sits. See Textile Mills, Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 
314 U.S. 326 (1941); 23 U.S.C. § 46 (1964); cf. note 25 infra. 
23. 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir.), affd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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the case came on for hearing by the court of appeals, two judges 
of that court, acting in concert while the court itself was in adjourn-
ment, had enjoined the sale of public schools by an Alabama school 
board to a private corporation intending to operate them on a 
racially segregated basis. Apparently, they had ruled under section 
1651(b), for dicta in the court's opinion indicated that section 
1651(b) would have supported the use of the injunctive power by 
either of the two acting alone. Several policy considerations which 
could well be raised against the issuance of an injunction by a 
single appellate court judge were then listed: 
[I]t has been the practice of . . . the Eighth Circuit, by 
agreement among ourselves, to require ( except in extreme emer-
gency situations) that ·any application for a writ receive the 
consideration of at least two judges. . . . The object of the 
practice is to prevent any attempt at "shopping" as to such 
applications; to make the soundness of the action on such 
applications more certain; and to avoid the public unseemliness 
of a single circuit judge setting up his judgment against that 
of another individual (the district judge).24 
The policy factors thus presented in Aaron, coupled with the 
difference in effect between show-cause writs and injunctive orders, 
suggest that the distinction established by the All Writs Statute 
between an alternative writ or rule nisi and a temporary restrain-
ing order relative to whether they can be issued by a single judge 
of a multiple judge court is one properly maintained; the specific 
language of section 165l(b) should not be interpreted to include 
injunctive power for a single appellate court judge. 
Perhaps an even more persuasive reason for denying the injunc-
tive power to a single appellate court judge is that the very quality 
which distinguishes a temporary restraining order from an alterna-
tive ·writ or rule nisi-required conformity to the command of a 
temporary order before a court hearing-creates the possibility that 
substantive issues can be decided by a single court of appeals judge.25 
24. 261 F.2d at 101 n.l. See also note 46 infra. While the Aaron dicta indicated that 
any application for a writ should receive the scrutiny of at least two judges, the con-
text suggests that the court did not have orders to show cause in mind when it made 
the statement. In any event, it would seem that the court's policy is more appropriately 
addressed to the injunctive power than to the relatively impotent show-cause writ 
power. 
25. Decision of substantive issues by a single circuit court judge would be contrary 
to the policy embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1964), which reads in part: "(c) Cases and 
controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not more than 
three judges •••• (d) A majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a 
court or division thereof, as provided in paragraph (c), shall constitute a quorum." 
Without this quorum, a court of appeals may not legally transact business. See Tobin 
v. Ramey, 206 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1953). 
Even outside the context of the court-single judge problem the law is wary of let-
ting a temporary order preclude appeal. It has been held that a temporary. injun_ction 
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This possibility materialized in a 1964 case, Application of Presi-
dent & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,26 which arose when 
a woman who was bleeding to death from a ruptured ulcer refused 
blood transfusions on religious grounds. The hospital in which she 
was a patient, fearing liability if the woman were allowed to die, 
requested permission from the district court to administer blood. 
When this petition was denied, oral application for authorization 
to give blood was made to Judge Wright of the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. In order to preserve the status 
quo in a case over which his court had probable jurisdiction to 
review the district court's denial of relief, Judge Wright ordered the 
hospital to transfuse the patient to the extent "necessary to save 
her life."27 By the time Judge Wright's ruling was reviewed by the 
court of appeals en bane, the substantive questions were deemed 
moot because the patient had recovered and the order was no 
longer in effect.28 Thus, a single court of appeals judge's directive, 
equivalent to a temporary restraining order, effectively disposed 
of such questions as the patient's constitutional rights to the free 
exercise of her religion and liberty from invasion of her person 
without due process of law.29 
In justifying his individual use of the injunctive power, Judge 
Wright utilized several alternative arguments. He relied primarily 
upon section 165I(b) and Rule 62(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, noting Aaron with approval. 30 Rule 62(g) simply provides that 
will be denied when its effect would be "to give [the party requesting the injunction] 
the fruits of victory whether or not the appeal has merit." Jimenez v. Barber, 252 F.2d 
550, 553 (9th Cir. 1958). Nevertheless, other opinions indicate that an injunction may 
issue even though substantive questions are thereby settled or rendered moot before 
appeal. Compare Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 80 Sup. Ct. 33 (Brennan, Circuit 
Justice, 1959) (enforcement of an Alaskan statute prohibiting fish traps enjoined 
pending final determination of its validity by the Supreme Court although fishing 
season would have expired by time of hearing on merits), with Griffin v. County 
School Bd., 375 U.S. 391 (1964) (injunction against state aid to segregated private 
schools granted although most of school year would expire before scheduled hearing 
on merits). But see Johnson v. Stevenson, 335 U.S. 801 (1948) (injunction against the 
certification of the name of Lyndon B. Johnson as a Democratic party nominee denied 
because review of Texas primary was impossible before the general election and the 
injunction would therefore have granted applicant all the relief sought). 
26. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright J.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 1883 (1964). 
Zl. Judge Wright issued the order to the hospital and not the patient. In other 
words, he directed his "injunction" at the party which had requested it, instead of 
the "offending" party. , 
28. See Application of President &: Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 
1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 1883 (1964). 
29. See generally 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 159 (1965). Significant procedural questions 
were also presented. No formal complaint had been filed and no notice of appeal was 
given. It is not certain that a case or controversy was presented in the application to 
the district court because it was not at all clear that the hospital would be liable in 
damages for the death of the patient. For a discussion of these and other questions 
raised by the Georgetown case, see 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 706 (1964). 
30. In addition, Judge Wright cited Woods v. Wright, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 445 
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the other subsections of Rule 62, which regulate a district court's 
power to issue stays and in junctions pending appeal, do not "limit any 
power of an appellate court or judge to ... grant an injunction 
during the pending of an appeal .... " These words make no positive 
delegation of power;31 they merely signify an intention to leave un-
disturbed any authority that may be granted elsewhere. The burden 
of justification for Judge Wright's action must therefore rest entirely 
upon section 165l(b), even though the writs which it authorizes 
differ significantly from a temporary restraining order.32 
As a second ground to support his exercise of the injunctive 
power, Judge Wright referred to subsection (a) of the All Writs 
Statute and suggested that although its grant of power is to "courts," 
where the issuance of such writs as it authorizes has been customarily 
undertaken by individual judges of courts of appeals, "courts" should 
be construed to include an individual appellate court judge.33 
(5th Cir. May 22, 1963), in which Negro parents filed a class suit in a federal district 
court\ asking for a temporary restraining order against the suspension or e.xpulsion of 
their children from school for participation in civil rights demonstrations. When the 
district court denied relief, application was made to Chief Judge Tuttle of the <::ourt 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, who granted an injunction purportedly resting on 
the authority of § 165l(b) and rule 62(g). Judge Tuttle stated: "These orders of sus-
pension and expulsion, in my opinion, will not be permitted to stand when the case 
is reached on the merits in the Court of Appeals. It, therefore, becomes my duty to 
maintain the status quo of these individual students to the end that their education is 
not illegally interfered with, until the case can be argued and decided in the Court of 
Appeals." Id. at 477. 
31. See Alexander v. United States, 173 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1949). 
32. The language of § 165l(b) presents another vexing problem under the facts 
of Georgetown. Subsection (a) provides for the issuance of writs "in aid of jurisdiction" 
and has been held to be available in cases potentially within a court's appellate juris-
diction, even though no appeal had yet been taken. See, e.g., McClelland v. Carland, 
217 U.S. 268 (1910); United States v. District Court, 238 F.2d 713 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 981 (1956); In re Previn, 204 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1953). But cf. United 
States v. Spadafora, 207 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1953). On the other hand, there is a pos-
sibility that the language of subsection (b) would restrict an appellate judge's use of 
that provision to cases where an appeal has been taken, because subsection (b) allows 
issuance of an alternative writ or rule nisi only by a member of a court which "has 
jurisdiction," seemingly a more restrictive concept than that in subsection (a). See 
Woods v. Wright, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 455 (5th Cir. May 22, 1963), where Chief Judge 
Tuttle was careful to note that a good appeal from a final order had been taken. He 
concluded that "it is clear • • • that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of this 
appeal within the contemplation of § 165l{b)." Id. at 446. If this reasoning is applied 
to the facts of Georgetown, where no semblance of a formal appeal was in progress and 
there was even a question whether the jurisdiction of the district court had been 
properly invoked, Judge Wright would appear to have had no power to issue any 
writ under subsection (b). However, such an implication in Judge Tuttle's statement 
appears untenable in view of the show-cause nature of subsection (b) writs. A require-
ment that an actual appeal be perfected before subsection (b) writs could issue would 
eliminate the very function for which these show-cause writs are designed: the initia-
tion of proceedings for subsection (a) writs, including writs of mandamus and pro-
hibition to correct an error of a trial court in an interlocutory order. See note 3 supra; 
cases cited notes 7 8: 8 supra. 
33. Cf. Bennett v. Bennett, 3 Fed. Cas. 212 (No. 1318) (D. Ore. 1867), where a 
statutory construction problem remarkably similar to that confronting Judge Wright 
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Limited authority for an individual Supreme Court Justice or a 
judge of a court of appeals to issue injunctions was expressly provided 
for prior to the 1948 revision of Title 28 of the United States Code,84 
but was omitted from the later version, apparently because it was felt 
that the Rules of Civil Procedure made it unnecessary.3G However, 
even before 1948 individual court of appeals judges could grant a 
temporary injunction only in enumerated circumstances, such as the 
unavailability of a district court jndge,36 not present in Georgetown, 
where the district judge had actually denied such an order. There· 
fore, this second argument, while perhaps more viable than an inter• 
pretation of the specific language of subsection (b) as including the 
injunctive power, is nevertheless questionable. 
Judge Wright relegated what was perhaps his best argument for 
the existence of injunctive power in a single judge to a footnote in 
which he cited Rule 6 of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
General Rules and Rule 51 of the United States Supreme Court 
Rules.87 Rule 6 states that "except as othenvise provided in [the 
General Rules], the practice in [the Court of Appeals] shall so far 
as practicable be the same as in the Supreme Court of the United 
States." Thus, Judge Wright was implying that this provision made 
in Georgetown was presented. This case considered the power of an individual judge 
to grant habeas corpus under the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. XIX, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, which 
read in part that "all of the before mentioned courts of the United States shall have 
power to issue writs of habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for 
by statute w.hich may be necessary for exercise of their respective jurisdiction and 
agreeable to the principles and usages of law." The judge concluded that the power 
conferred on the "court to issue the writ ad subjuciendum [a form of habeas corpus] 
may be exercised by the judge thereof. This is 'agreeable to the principles and usages 
of law' regulating the issuing of this writ" Bennett v. Bennett, supra at 219. It should 
be noted, however, that the problem presented in Bennett concerned the power of a 
judge of a single-judge court to issue habeas corpus in chambers, and not the power 
of a single judge of a multi-judge court to act by himself. Indeed, the judge in 
Bennett noted that "where a court is constituted with more than one judge, it might 
well be from the nature of its organization, that a grant of power to such a co.urt, to 
issue writs of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, could not be exercised by a single 
judge thereof." Ibid. 
34. REv. STAT. § 719 (1875). This statute was incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 378 
(1946), which read as follows: "Writs of injunction may be granted by any justice of 
the Supreme Court in cases where they might be granted by the Supreme Court; and 
by any judge of a district court in cases where they might be granted by such court. 
But no justice of the Supreme Court shall hear or allow any application for an in• 
junction or restraining order in any case pending in the circuit to which he is al19tted, 
elsewhere than within such circuit, or at such place outside of the same as the parties 
may stipulate in writing, except when it cannot be heard by the district judge of 
the district. In case of absence from the district of the district judge, or of bis dis• 
ability, any circuit judge of the circuit in which the district is situated may grant an 
injunction or restraining order in any case pending in the district court, where the 
same might be granted by the district judge." 
35. See In re Equitable Office Bldg., 72 Sup. Ct. 1086, 1088 n.4 (Reed, Circuit Justice 
1946): ROBERTSON &: Km.KHAM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 893. 
36. See note 34 supra. 
37. 331 F.2d at 1006 n.14. 
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available to him the same power exercised by Supreme Court Justices 
by virtue of Rule 51, which declares that a Justice acting alone can 
issue an injunction in any situation where the Court could grant 
one.38 Rule 51 has made it possible for Justices to avoid the ques-
tionable practice of relying upon section 165l(b) when faced with 
a situation similar to that confronting Judge Wright. In Meredith 
v. Fair,89 for example, Mr. Justice Black vacated a Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals judge's stay of a judgment of that court and en-
joined respondents from seeking further stays. To justify his in-
dividual use of the injunctive power, Mr. Justice Black referred 
merely to section 1651 and Rule 51. 
Judge Wright's argument, however, does not give clear support 
to the concept of a general injunctive power in a single judge of an 
appellate court. In the first place, the validity of Rule 51 itself may 
be suspect. The enabling act which grants the Court the power to 
formulate its mm rules provides that all such rules "shall be con-
sistent with Acts of Congress .... "40 The language of section 1651 
indicates that subsection (a) writs are to be issued by the Supreme 
Court.41 Rule 51 would seem inconsistent with this language insofar 
as it purports to authorize a single Justice to exercise injunctive 
power. So, too, the Supreme Court rules are only to regulate its 
procedure and must neither enlarge nor restrict its jurisdiction, 
nor abrogate or modify substantive law.42 If granting injunctive 
power constitutes either a jurisdictional or a substantive change, 
then Rule 51 is questionable.48 Second, even if Rule 51 were deemed 
88. U.S. SUP. Cr. R. 51. It is interesting to note that this provision was added to 
the Supreme Court Rules in 1954, suggesting perhaps that the Supreme Court ques• 
tioned the existence of any injunctive power in a single Justice under then existing 
law. 
89. 871 U.S. 29 (1962). Although Mr. Justice Black felt that he clearly had this 
power, he was careful to consult with his fellow Justices before issuing the injunction. 
Ibid. 
The staying of a judgment should not be confused with the exercise of the writ 
power under § 1651. Stays merely postpone the enforcement of a duly rendered judg• 
ment, usually pending appeal. See FED. R. CIV, P. 62. In cases where a final judgment 
is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, 28 U.S.C. § 2101(£) 
(1964) expressly provides that "a stay may be granted by a judge of the court render· 
ing the judgment or by a justice of the Supreme Court •••• " 
40. 28 u.s.c. § 2071 (1964). 
41. See text accompanying notes 21 and 22 supra. 
42. See Washington So. Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. "629 
(1924); Standish v. Gold Creek Mining Co., 92 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 302 
U.S. 765 (1987). 
48. The Supreme Court has considered the validity of its exercise of the power to 
prescribe the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, now granted by 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1964). In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1945), the 
Court stated: "The fact that this Court promulgated the rules as formulated and 
recommended by the committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, 
meaning or consistency." But cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). In Sib-
bach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), the Court upheld, by a five-to-four vote, the 
validity of rule 35, which provides for mental and physical examinations of litigants. 
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valid, it is not clear that the term "practice" in Rule 6 of the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals Rules is broad enough to incorporate 
a provision like Supreme Court Rule 51.44 Moreover, not all courts 
of appeals rules contain counterparts of Rule 6.45 The circuitous 
derivation of authority utilized by Judge Wright is not available in 
the Eighth Circuit, for example, where Aaron was decided. 
There may be cases in which an individual judge of a court of 
In so doing, the Court relied heavily upon the fact that the Supreme Court must sub-
mit proposed Rules of Civil Procedure to Congress, where they may be vetoed if 
contrary to congressional policy. If Congress takes no adverse action during a specified 
period after submission, the proposed rules become final by virtue of § 2072, super• 
seding prior conflicting law. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, supra. Section 2071 of 
Title 28, under which the Supreme Court makes its own rules, has no comparable 
provision for congressional scrutiny and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto do 
not supersede prior conflicting law, but must be consistent with acts of Congress. 
See generally 1 BARRON & HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE &: PROCEDURE 6-7 (2d ed. Wright 
1960). 
In discussing the power of the Supreme Court to prescribe the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Professor Sunderland has suggested that "all remedies which consti-
tuted interference with personal liberty or control over property" should be deemed 
substantive on grounds of public policy and therefore not within the purview of the 
Rules. Sunderland, Character and Extent of Rule Making Power Granted Supreme 
Court, 21 A.B.A.J. 404, 406 (1935). While Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., supra, indicates that 
this policy distinction is a dead letter with regard to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro· 
cedure, it may nevertheless remain sound in regard to Supreme Court Rules because 
of the lack of a requirement of congressional scrutiny. Professor Moore cites the 
Supreme Court's failure to promulgate Rule 77 of the Advisory Committee's April 
1937 draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as "an excellent illustration of 
the great caution normally exercised by the Supreme Court in observing the statutory 
and self-imposed limitations on its power to make rules ••.• " 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC• 
TICE § 1.04(2) (2d ed. 1964). Rule 77 would have allowed registration of judgments 
rendered by one district court in any other district. The fact that the Court did not 
promulgate this desirable rule, which was subsequently embodied in an amendment 
to the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964), indicates, Moore suggests, that the Court 
believed that the matter was of a substantive or jurisdictional nature, and therefore 
beyond the scope of the Rules. Ibid. 
This treatment of the court rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be 
compared with the treatment of the injunctive power under the equitable remedial 
rights doctrine in diversity cases after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In 
Black v. Mahogeny Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1942), the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that the injunctive power was remedial rather than substantive 
and that, therefore, the fact that state law made no provision for injunctions in trade 
libel cases did not prevent federal courts from granting such relief. This holding is 
questioned by Professor Moore, who maintains that "if a federal court properly pro-
ceeds to adjudication it must in a diversity case grant or decline to give an injunction 
• • • strictly in accordance with applicable state law. The Erie case demands this 
••.. " 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra, § 2.09. Moreover, the doctrine has been rejected by other 
courts on the ground that the granting of equitable remedies involves more than 
a question of procedural law, the area in which, after Erie, federal courts have been 
able to apply their own rules in diversity cases. See, e.g., McAndress v. Belknan, 141 
F.2d lll (6th Cir. 1944); Meyer v. City of Eufaula, 132 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1942). See 
generally 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra, § 2.09; 55 YALE L.J. 401 (1946). 
44. See 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 43, § 1.04. 
45. The following circuits have rules comparable to Rule 6 of the District of 
Columbia Circuit: the First Circuit (Rule 9); the Fourth Circuit (Rule 7): the Ninth 
Circuit (Rule 8(2)); and the Tenth Circuit (Rule 8). The proposed Uniform Appellate 
Rules, however, contain no provision similar to Rule 6. 
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appeals should have the power to issue a temporary restraining order; 
however, if the policy considerations presented in Aaron are valid, 
an unrestricted grant of the injunctive power to a single appellate 
judge would be unwise.46 The language of section 165l(b) provides 
no limitations on the exercise of its powers; there is no requirement 
that irreparable harm be imminent unless some action is taken, 
that a judge of a multi-judge court consult with other members of 
the court where possible, or that no writ be issued thereunder when 
that action could lead to substantive issues being decided prior to an 
adversary hearing. No such limitations are needed for a show-cause 
·writ, which serves merely to initiate proceedings. Perhaps it is this 
show-cause nature of rules nisi and alternative writs which prompted 
language expressly granting to a single judge the power to issue them 
under section 165l(b) while apparently limiting the authority to issue 
subsection (a) writs, including temporary restraining orders, to a 
court. Furthermore, an interpretation of subsection (b) as encom-
passing the injunctive power would seem to open a Pandora's Box. 
If the phrase "alternative writ or rule nisi" includes the temporary 
restraining order, why should it not also encompass other sec-
tion 165l(a) writs47 such as those of peremptory mandamus and 
prohibition? Once section 165l(b) is expanded to embrace more 
than show-cause writs, its language no longer affords any logical 
basis for drawing a line excluding any ·writs from the scope of the 
provision. 
It appears that the Judicial Code, perhaps inadvertently, makes 
no provision for the issuance of injunctions by a· single appellate 
court judge. Arguably, such a power is essential to effective judicial 
administration. In emergencies, when a multi-judge court cannot 
be formally convened, a single jucJge should have the power to 
preserve the status quo, so long as the substantive issues are left 
intact for review by the court. An amendment to the Judicial Code, 
couched in the language of Supreme Court Rule 51, but with express 
limitations such as those mentioned above,48 would clarify this con-
fused area and would render unnecessary the current judicial efforts 
to expand section 165l(b) beyond its proper scope. 
46. See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 
U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 1 (1964). Referring to federal injunctions against the enforcement of 
state statutes, Professor Currie argued in favor of a three-judge district court to hear 
cases involving a question of constitutionality of state legislation, noting that "in-
junctions-especially federal ones-have been a long-standing source of special discom-
fort and the frequent subject of special legislation. An injunction paralyzes action 
until final decision of the case, perhaps after two appeals. Reversal of an erroneous 
injunction is often little solace to the victim; in the interval, irreparable damage may 
have been done •.•• While it is possible that two judges out of a panel of three may 
be mistaken or even prejudiced, it is more possible that a single judge may be; and 
if the mistake is an honest one, even one clear-eyed judge among the three may be able 
to forestall a bad decision." Id. at 6-8. 
47. See generally note 3 supra. 
48. See text following note 46 supra. 
